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Chapter 4 1
Modal !-Logic: Automata, 2
Neo-Logicism, and Set-Theoretic Realism 3
Hasen Khudairi 4
Abstract This essay examines the philosophical significance of !-logic in 5
Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with choice (ZFC). The dual isomorphism between 6
algebra and coalgebra permits Boolean-valued algebraic models of ZFC to be 7
interpreted as coalgebras. The modal profile of !-logical validity can then be 8
countenanced within a coalgebraic logic, and !-logical validity can be defined via 9
deterministic automata. I argue that the philosophical significance of the foregoing 10
is two-fold. First, because the epistemic and modal profiles of !-logical validity 11
correspond to those of second-order logical consequence, !-logical validity is 12
genuinely logical, and thus vindicates a neo-logicist conception of mathematical 13
truth in the set-theoretic multiverse. Second, the foregoing provides a modal- 14
computational account of the interpretation of mathematical vocabulary, adducing 15
in favor of a realist conception of the cumulative hierarchy of sets. 16
Keywords Modal !-logic · !-logical Validity · Modal Coalgebraic Automata · 17
Neo-Logicism · Set-theoretic Realism 18
4.1 Introduction 19
This essay examines the philosophical significance of the consequence relation 20
defined in the !-logic for set-theoretic languages. I argue that, as with second- 21
order logic, the modal profile of validity in !-Logic enables the property to be 22
epistemically tractable. Because of the dual isomorphism between algebras and 23
coalgebras, Boolean-valued models of set theory can be interpreted as coalgebras. 24
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In Sect. 4.2, I demonstrate how the modal profile of !-logical validity can be 25
countenanced within a coalgebraic logic, and how !-logical validity can further 26
be defined via automata. In Sect. 4.3, I examine how models of epistemic modal 27
algebras to which modal coalgebraic automata are dually isomorphic are availed 28
of in the computational theory of mind. Finally, in Sect. 4.4, the philosophical 29
significance of the characterization of the modal profile of !-logical validity for the 30
philosophy of mathematics is examined. I argue (i) that it vindicates a type of neo- 31
logicism with regard to mathematical truth in the set-theoretic multiverse, and (ii) 32
that it provides a modal and computational account of formal grasp of the concept 33
of ‘set’, adducing in favor of a realist conception of the cumulative hierarchy of sets. 34
Section 4.5 provides concluding remarks. 35
4.2 Definitions 36
In this section, I define the axioms of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with choice. I 37
define the mathematical properties of the large cardinal axioms to which ZFC can 38
be adjoined, and I provide a detailed characterization of the properties of!-logic for 39
ZFC. Because Boolean-valued algebraic models of!-logic are dually isomorphic to 40
coalgebras, a category of coalgebraic logic is then characterized which models both 41
modal logic and deterministic automata. Modal coalgebraic models of automata are 42
then argued to provide a precise characterization of the modal and computationalAQ1 43
profiles of !-logical validity. 44
4.2.1 Axioms1 45
• Empty set: 46
∃x∀u(u /∈ x) 47
• Extensionality: 48
x = y ⇐⇒ ∀u(u ∈ x ⇐⇒ u ∈ y) 49
• Pairing: 50
∃x∀u(u ∈ x ⇐⇒ u = a ∨ u = b) 51
• Union: 52
∃x∀u[u ∈ x ⇐⇒ ∃v(u ∈ v ∧ v ∈ a)] 53
• Separation: 54
∃x∀u[u ∈ x ⇐⇒ u ∈ a ∧ φ(u)] 55
• Power Set: 56
∃x∀u(u ∈ x ⇐⇒ u ⊆ a) 57
1For a standard presentation, see Jech (2003). For detailed, historical discussion, see Maddy
(1988a).
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• Infinity: 58
∃x∅ ∈ x ∧ ∀u(u ∈ x→ {u} ∈ x) 59
• Replacement: 60
∀u∃!vψ(u, v)→ ∀x∃y(∀u ∈ x)(∃v ∈ y)ψ(u, v) 61
• Choice: 62
∀u[u ∈ a → ∃v(v ∈ u)] ∧ ∀u, x[u ∈ a ∧ x ∈ a → ∃v(v ∈ u ⇐⇒ v ∈ 63
x) ∨ ¬v(v ∈ u ∧ v ∈ x)]→ ∃x∀u[u ∈ a→ ∃!v(v ∈ u ∧ u ∈ x)] 64
4.2.2 Large Cardinals 65
Borel sets of reals are subsets of ωω or R, closed under countable intersections and 66
unions.2 For all ordinals, a, such that 0 < a < ω1, and b < a, %0a denotes the open 67
subsets of ωω formed under countable unions of sets in &0b, and &
0
a denotes the 68
closed subsets of ωω formed under countable intersections of %0b . 69
Projective sets of reals are subsets of ωω, formed by complementations (ωω – u, 70
for u ⊆ ωω) and projections [p(u) = {⟨x1, . . . , xn⟩ ∈ ωω | ∃y⟨x1, . . . , xn, y⟩ ∈ u}]. 71
For all ordinals a, such that 0 < a < ω, &10 denotes closed subsets of ω
ω; &1a is 72
formed by taking complements of the open subsets of ωω, %1a ; and %
1
a+1 is formed 73
by taking projections of sets in&1a . 74
The full power set operation defines the cumulative hierarchy of sets, V, such thatAQ2 75
V0 = ∅; Va+1 = P(V0); and Vλ =⋃a<λVa . 76
In the inner model program (cf. Woodin 2001, 2010, 2011; Kanamori 2012a,b), 77
the definable power set operation defines the constructible universe, L(R), in the 78
universe of sets V, where the sets are transitive such that a ∈ C ⇐⇒ a ⊆ C; 79
L(R) = Vω+1; La+1(R) = Def(La(R)); and Lλ(R) =⋃a<λ(La(R)). 80
Via inner models, Gödel (1940) proves the consistency of the generalized 81
continuum hypothesis, ℵℵaa = ℵa+1, as well as the axiom of choice, relative to the 82
axioms of ZFC. However, for a countable transitive set of ordinals, M, in a model 83
of ZF without choice, one can define a generic set, G, such that, for all formulas, φ, 84
either φ or¬φ is forced by a condition, f , in G. Let M[G] =⋃a<κ Ma[G], such that 85
M0[G] = {G}; with λ < κ , Mλ[G] =⋃a<λMa[G]; and Ma+1[G] = Va ∩Ma[G].3 86
G is a Cohen real over M, and comprises a set-forcing extension of M. The relation 87
of set-forcing, !, can then be defined in the ground model, M, such that the forcing 88
condition, f , is a function from a finite subset of ω into {0,1}, and f ! u ∈ G if 89
f (u) = 1 and f ! u /∈ G if f (u) = 0. The cardinalities of an open dense ground 90
model, M, and a generic extension, G, are identical, only if the countable chain 91
condition (c.c.c.) is satisfied, such that, given a chain – i.e., a linearly ordered subset 92
of a partially ordered (reflexive, antisymmetric, transitive) set – there is a countable, 93
2See Koellner (2013), for the presentation, and for further discussion, of the definitions in this and
the subsequent paragraph.
3See Kanamori (2012a: 2.1; 2012b: 4.1), for further discussion.
UN
CO
RR
EC
TE
D
PR
OO
F
H. Khudairi
maximal antichain consisting of pairwise incompatible forcing conditions. Via set- 94
forcing extensions, Cohen (1963, 1964) constructs a model of ZF which negates 95
the generalized continuum hypothesis, and thus proves the independence thereof 96
relative to the axioms of ZF.4 97
Gödel (1946/1990: 1–2) proposes that the value of Orey sentences such as the 98
GCH might yet be decidable, if one avails of stronger theories to which new 99
axioms of infinity – i.e., large cardinal axioms – are adjoined.5 He writes that: 100
‘In set theory, e.g., the successive extensions can be represented by stronger and 101
stronger axioms of infinity. It is certainly impossible to give a combinatorial and 102
decidable characterization of what an axiom of infinity is; but there might exist, 103
e.g., a characterization of the following sort: An axiom of infinity is a proposition 104
which has a certain (decidable) formal structure and which in addition is true. 105
Such a concept of demonstrability might have the required closure property, i.e. 106
the following could be true: Any proof for a set-theoretic theorem in the next higher 107
system above set theory . . . is replaceable by a proof from such an axiom of infinity. 108
It is not impossible that for such a concept of demonstrability some completeness 109
theoremwould hold which would say that every proposition expressible in set theory 110
is decidable from present axioms plus some true assertion about the largeness of the 111
universe of sets’. 112
For cardinals, x,a,C, C ⊆ a is closed unbounded in a, if it is closed [if x < C and 113⋃
(C ∩ a) = a, then a ∈ C] and unbounded (⋃C = a) (Kanamori, op. cit.: 360). 114
A cardinal, S, is stationary in a, if, for any closed unbounded C ⊆ a, C ∩ S ̸= ∅ 115
(op. cit.). An ideal is a subset of a set closed under countable unions, whereas filters 116
are subsets closed under countable intersections (361). A cardinal κ is regular if the 117
cofinality of κ – comprised of the unions of sets with cardinality less than κ – is 118
identical to κ . Uncountable regular limit cardinals are weakly inaccessible (op. cit.). 119
A strongly inaccessible cardinal is regular and has a strong limit, such that if λ < κ , 120
then 2λ < κ (op. cit.). 121
Large cardinal axioms are defined by elementary embeddings.6 Elementary 122
embeddings can be defined thus. For models A,B, and conditions φ, j: A → B, 123
φ⟨a1, . . . , an⟩ in A if and only if φ⟨j(a1), . . . , j(an)⟩ in B (363). A measurable 124
cardinal is defined as the ordinal denoted by the critical point of j, crit(j) (Koellner 125
and Woodin 2010: 7). Measurable cardinals are inaccessible (Kanamori, op. cit.). 126
Let κ be a cardinal, and η > κ an ordinal. κ is then η-strong, if there is a transitive 127
class M and an elementary embedding, j: V→ M, such that crit(j) = κ, j(κ) > η, 128
and Vη ⊆ M (Koellner and Woodin, op. cit.). 129
κ is strong if and only if, for all η, it is η-strong (op. cit.). 130
4See Kanamori (2008), for further discussion.
5See Kanamori (2007), for further discussion. Kanamori (op. cit.: 154) notes that Gödel
(1931/1986: fn48a) makes a similar appeal to higher-order languages, in his proofs of the incom-
pleteness theorems. The incompleteness theorems are examined in further detail, in Sect. 4.4.2,
below.
6The definitions in the remainder of this subsection follow the presentations in Koellner and
Woodin (2010) and Woodin (2010, 2011).
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If A is a class, κ is η-A-strong, if there is a j : V → M, such that κ is η-strong 131
and j(A ∩ Vκ) ∩ Vη = A ∩ Vη (op. cit.). 132
κ is a Woodin cardinal, if κ is strongly inaccessible, and for all A ⊆ Vκ , there is a 133
cardinal κA < κ , such that κA is η-A-strong, for all η such that κη, η < κ (Koellner 134
and Woodin, op. cit.: 8). 135
κ is superstrong, if j : V → M, such that crit(j) = κ and Vj (κ) ⊆ M, which 136
entails that there are arbitrarily large Woodin cardinals below κ (op. cit.). 137
Large cardinal axioms can then be defined as follows. 138
∃x* is a large cardinal axiom, because: 139
(i) *x is a %2-formula; 140
(ii) if κ is a cardinal, such that V |= *(κ), then κ is strongly inaccessible; and 141
(iii) for all generic partial orders P ∈ Vκ , VP |= *(κ); INS is a non-stationary 142
ideal; AG is the canonical representation of reals in L(R), i.e. the interpretation 143
of A in M[G]; H(κ) is comprised of all of the sets whose transitive closure is 144
< κ (cf. Rittberg 2015); and L(R)Pmax |= ⟨H(ω2), ∈, INS , AG⟩ |= ‘φ’. P is a 145
homogeneous partial order in L(R), such that the generic extension of L(R)P 146
inherits the generic invariance, i.e., the absoluteness, of L(R). Thus, L(R)Pmax 147
is (i) effectively complete, i.e. invariant under set-forcing extensions; and (ii) 148
maximal, i.e. satisfies all &2-sentences and is thus consistent by set-forcing 149
over ground models (Woodin (ms): 28). 150
Assume ZFC and that there is a proper class of Woodin cardinals; A ∈ P(R) ∩ 151
L(R); φ is a &2-sentence; and V(G), s.t. ⟨H(ω2), ∈, INS , AG⟩ |= ‘φ’: Then, it can 152
be proven that L(R)Pmax |= ⟨H(ω2), ∈, INS , AG⟩ |= ‘φ’, where ‘φ’ := ∃A ∈ 153
+∞⟨H(ω1), ∈, A⟩ |= ψ . 154
The axiom of determinacy (AD) states that every set of reals, a ⊆ ωω is 155
determined, where κ is determined if it is decidable. 156
Woodin’s (1999) Axiom (*) can be thus countenanced: 157
ADL(R) and L[(Pω1)] is a Pmax-generic extension of L(R), 158
from which it can be derived that 2ℵ0 = ℵ2. Thus, ¬CH; and so CH is absolutely 159
decidable. 160
4.2.3 !-Logic 161
For partial orders, P, let VP = VB, where B is the regular open completion of (P).7 162
Ma = (Va)M and MBa = (VBa )M = (VMBa ). Sent denotes a set of sentences in 163
a first-order language of set theory. T ∪ {φ} is a set of sentences extending ZFC. 164
c.t.m abbreviates the notion of a countable transitive ∈-model. c.B.a. abbreviates 165
the notion of a complete Boolean algebra. 166
7The definitions in this section follow the presentation in Bagaria et al. (2006).
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Define a c.B.a. in V, such that VB. Let VB0 = ∅;VBλ =
⋃
b<λ V
B
b , with λ a limit 167
ordinal; VBa+1 = {f : X→ B |X ⊆ VBa }; and VB =
⋃
a∈OnVBa . 168
φ is true in VB, if its Boolean-value is 1B, if and only if 169
VB |= φ iff !φ"B = 1B. 170
Thus, for all ordinals, a, and every c.B.a.B, VBa ≡ (Va)V B iff for all x ∈ VB, 171∃y ∈ VB!x = y"B = 1B iff !x ∈ VB"B = 1B. 172
Then, VBa |= φ iff VB |= ‘Va |= φ’. 173
!-logical validity can then be defined as follows: 174
For T ∪ {φ} ⊆ Sent , 175
T |=! φ, if for all ordinals, a, and c.B.a.B, if VBa |= T, then VBa |= φ. 176
Supposing that there exists a proper class of Woodin cardinals and if T ∪ {φ} ⊆ 177
Sent , then for all set-forcing conditions, P: 178
T |=! φ iff VT |= ‘T |=! φ’, 179
where T |=! φ ≡ ∅ |= ‘T |=! φ’. 180
The !-Conjecture states that V |=! φ iff VB |=! φ (Woodin ms). Thus, !- 181
logical validity is invariant in all set-forcing extensions of ground models in the 182
set-theoretic multiverse. 183
The soundness of !-Logic is defined by universally Baire sets of reals. For a 184
cardinal, e, let a set A be e-universally Baire, if for all partial orders P of cardinality 185
e, there exist trees, S and T on ω X λ, such that A = p[T] and if G ⊆ P is 186
generic, then p[T]G = RG – p[S]G (Koellner 2013). A is universally Baire, if it 187
is e-universally Baire for all e (op. cit.). 188
!-Logic is sound, such that V ⊢! φ → V |=! φ. However, the completeness 189
of !-Logic has yet to be resolved. 190
Finally, in category theory, a category C is comprised of a class Ob(C) of objects 191
a family of arrows for each pair of objects C(A,B) (Venema 2007: 421). A functor 192
from a category C to a category D, E: C→ D, is an operation mapping objects and 193
arrows of C to objects and arrows of D (422). An endofunctor on C is a functor, E: 194
C→ C (op. cit.). 195
A E-coalgebra is a pair A = (A, µ), with A an object of C referred to as the 196
carrier of A, and µ: A→ E(A) is an arrow in C, referred to as the transition map of 197
A (390). 198
A = ⟨A, µ: A→ E(A)⟩ is dually isomorphic to the category of algebras over the 199
functor µ (417–418). If µ is a functor on categories of sets, then Boolean-algebraic 200
models of !-logical validity are isomorphic to coalgebraic models. 201
The significance of the foregoing is that coalgebraic models may themselves be 202
availed of in order to define modal logic and automata theory. Coalgebras provide 203
therefore a setting in which the Boolean-valued models of set theory, the modal 204
profile of !-logical validity, and automata can be interdefined. In what follows, A 205
will comprise the coalgebraic model – dually isomorphic to the complete Boolean- 206
valued algebras defined in the !-Logic of ZFC – in which modal similarity types 207
and automata are definable. As a coalgebraic model of modal logic,A can be defined 208
as follows (407): 209
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For a set of formulas, *, let ∇* := " ∨ * ∧ ∧ ⋄*, where ⋄* denotes the set 210
{⋄φ |φ ∈ * (op. cit.). Then, 211
⋄φ ≡ ∇{φ,T}, 212
"φ ≡ ∇∅ ∨ ∇φ (op. cit.). 213
Let an E-coalgebraic modal model, A = ⟨S, λ,R[.]⟩, such that S,s ! ∇* if and 214
only if, for all (some) successors σ of s∈S, [*, σ (s) ∈ E(!A)] (op. cit.). 215
A coalgebraic model of deterministic automata can be thus defined (391). An 216
automaton is a tuple, A = ⟨A, aI , C, δ, F⟩, such that A is the state space of 217
the automaton A; aI ∈A is the automaton’s initial state; C is the coding for the 218
automaton’s alphabet, mapping numerals to properties of the natural numbers; δ: 219
A X C → A is a transition function, and F⊆ A is the collection of admissible 220
states, where F maps A to {1,0}, such that F: A → 1 if a∈F and A → 0 if a/∈F 221
(op. cit.). The determinacy of coalgebraic automata, the category of which is dually 222
isomorphic to the Set category satisfying !-logical consequence, is secured by the 223
existence of Woodin cardinals: Assuming ZFC, that λ is a limit of Woodin cardinals, 224
that there is a generic, set-forcing extension G ⊆ the collapse of ω < λ, and that 225
R∗ = ⋃{RG[a] |a < λ}, then R* |= the axiom of determinacy (AD) (Koellner and 226
Woodin, op. cit.: 10). 227
Finally, A = ⟨A, α:A→ E(A)⟩ is dually isomorphic to the category of algebras 228
over the functor α (417–418). For a category C, object A, and endofunctor E, 229
define a new arrow, α, s.t. α:EA → A. A homomorphism, f , can further be 230
defined between algebras ⟨A, α⟩, and ⟨B, β⟩. Then, for the category of algebras, 231
the following commutative square can be defined: (i) EA→ EB (Ef ); (ii) EA→ 232
A (α); (iii) EB → B (β); and (iv) A → B (f ) (cf. Hughes, 2001: 7–8). The same 233
commutative square holds for the category of coalgebras, such that the latter are 234
defined by inverting the direction of the morphisms in both (ii) [A→ EA (α)], and 235
(iii) [B→ EB (β)] (op. cit.). 236
Thus, A is the coalgebraic category for modal, deterministic automata, dually 237
isomorphic to the complete Boolean-valued algebraic models of !-logical validity, 238
as defined in the category of sets. 239
4.3 Epistemic Modal Algebras and the Computational 240
Theory of Mind 241
Beyond the remit of Boolean-valued models of set-theoretic languages, models of 242
epistemic modal algebras are availed of by a number of paradigms in contemporary 243
empirical theorizing, including the computational theory of mind and the theory 244
of quantum computability. In Epistemic Modal Algebra, the topological boolean 245
algebra, A, can be formed by taking the powerset of the topological space, X, defined 246
above; i.e., A = P(X). The domain of A is comprised of formula-terms – eliding 247
propositions with names – assigned to elements of P(X), where the proposition- 248
letters are interpreted as encoding states of information. The top element of the 249
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algebra is denoted ‘1’ and the bottom element is denoted ‘0’. We interpret modal 250
operators, f(x), – i.e., intensional functions in the algebra – as both concerning 251
topological interiority, as well as reflecting epistemic possibilities. An Epistemic 252
Modal-valued Algebraic structure has the form, F = ⟨A, DP(X), ρ⟩, where ρ is 253
a mapping from points in the topological space to elements or regions of the 254
algebraic structure; i.e., ρ : DP(X) x DP(X) → A. A model over the Epistemic- 255
Modal Topological Boolean Algebraic structure has the form M = ⟨F, V⟩, where 256
V(a) ≤ ρ(a) and V(a,b) ∧ ρ(a, b) ≤ V(b).8 For all xx/a,φ ,y∈A: 257
f(1) = 1; 258
f(x) ≤ x; 259
f(x ∧ y) = f(x) ∧ f(y); 260
f[f(x)] = f(x); 261
V(a, a) > 0; 262
V(a, a) = 1; 263
V(a, b) = V(b, a); 264
V(a, b) ∧ V(b, c) ≤ V(a, c); 265
V(a = a) = ρ(a, a); 266
V(a, b) ≤ f[V(a, b)]; 267
V(¬φ) = ρ(¬φ)− f(φ); 268
V(⋄φ) = ρφ − f[−V(φ)]; 269
V("φ) = f[V(φ)] (cf. Lando, op. cit.).9 270
Marcus (2001) argues that mental representations can be treated as algebraic 271
rules characterizing the computation of operations on variables, where the values 272
of a target domain for the variables are universally quantified over and the function 273
is one-one, mapping a number of inputs to an equivalent number of outputs (35–36). 274
Models of the above algebraic rules can be defined in both classical and weighted, 275
connectionist systems: Both a single and multiple nodes can serve to represent the 276
variables for a target domain (42–45). Temporal synchrony or dynamic variable- 277
bindings are stored in short-term working memory (56–57), while information 278
relevant to long-term variable-bindings are stored in registers (54–56). Examples 279
of the foregoing algebraic rules on variable-binding include both the syntactic 280
concatenation of morphemes and noun phrase reduplication in linguistics (37–39, 281
70–72), as well as learning algorithms (45–48). Conditions on variable-binding 282
are further examined, including treating the binding relation between variables 283
and values as tensor products – i.e., an application of a multiplicative axiom 284
for variables and their values treated as vectors (53–54, 105–106). In order to 285
account for recursively formed, complex representations, which he refers to as 286
structured propositions, Marcus argues instead that the syntax and semantics of such 287
representations can be modeled via an ordered set of registers, which he refers to as 288
‘treelets’ (108). 289
8See Lando (2015), McKinsey (1944) and Rasiowa (1963), for further details.
9Note that, in cases of Boolean-valued epistemic topological algebras, models of corresponding
coalgebras will be topological (cf. Takeuchi 1985 for further discussion).
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A strengthened version of the algebraic rules on variable-binding can be accom- 290
modated in models of epistemic modal algebras, when the latter are augmented 291
by cylindrifications, i.e., operators on the algebra simulating the treatment of 292
quantification, and diagonal elements.10 By contrast to Boolean Algebras with 293
Operators, which are propositional, cylindric algebras define first-order logics. 294
Intuitively, valuation assignments for first-order variables are, in cylindric modal 295
logics, treated as possible worlds of the model, while existential and universal 296
quantifiers are replaced by, respectively, possibility and necessity operators (⋄ and 297
") (Venema 2013: 249). For first-order variables, {vi | i < α} with α an arbitrary, 298
fixed ordinal, vi = vj is replaced by a modal constant di,j (op. cit: 250). The 299
following clauses are valid, then, for a model, M, of cylindric modal logic, with 300
Ei,j a monadic predicate and Ti for i, j < α a dyadic predicate: 301
M,w ! p ⇐⇒ w ∈ V(p); 302
M,w ! di,j ⇐⇒ w ∈ Ei,j ; 303
M,w ! ⋄iψ ⇐⇒ there is a v with wTiv and M, v ⊢ ψ (252).11 304
Finally, a cylindric modal algebra of dimension α is an algebra, A = ⟨A,+, •, 305
–, 0, 1, ⋄i , dij ⟩i,j<α , where ⋄i is a unary operator which is normal (⋄i0 = 0) and 306
additive [⋄i (x+ y) = ⋄ix+ ⋄iy)] (257). 307
The philosophical interest of cylindric modal algebras to Marcus’ cognitive 308
models of algebraic variable-binding is that variable substitution is treated in the 309
modal algebras as a modal relation, while universal quantification is interpreted as 310
necessitation. The interest of translating universal generalization into operations of 311
epistemic necessitation is, finally, that – by identifying epistemic necessity with 312
apriority – both the algebraic rules for variable-binding and the recursive formation 313
of structured propositions can be seen as operations, the implicit knowledge of 314
which is apriori. 315
In quantum information theory, let a constructor be a computation defined over 316
physical systems. Constructors entrain nomologically possible transformations from 317
admissible input states to output states (cf. Deutsch 2013). On this approach, 318
10See Henkin et al (op. cit.: 162–163) for the introduction of cylindric algebras, and for the axioms
governing the cylindrification operators.
11Cylindric frames need further to satisfy the following axioms (op. cit.: 254):
1. p→ ⋄ip
2. p→ "i ⋄i p
3. ⋄i ⋄i p→ ⋄ip
4. ⋄i ⋄j p→ ⋄j ⋄i p
5. di,i
6. ⋄i (di,j ∧ p)→ "i (di,j → p)
[Translating the diagonal element and cylindric (modal) operator into, respectively, monadic
and dyadic predicates and universal quantification: ∀xyz[(Tixy∧Ei,jy∧Tixz∧Ei,j z)→ y = z]
(op. cit.)]
7. di,j ⇐⇒ ⋄k(di,k],∧ dk,j ).
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information is defined in terms of constructors, i.e., intensional computational 319
properties. The foregoing transformations, as induced by constructors, are referred 320
to as tasks. Because constructors encode the counterfactual to the effect that, were 321
an initial state to be computed over, then the output state would result, modal 322
notions are thus constitutive of the definition of the tasks at issue. There are, further, 323
both topological and algebraic aspects of the foregoing modal approach to quantum 324
computation.12 The composition of tasks is formed by taking their union, where the 325
union of tasks can be satisfiable while its component tasks might not be. Suppose, 326
e.g., that the information states at issue concern the spin of a particle. A spin-state 327
vector will be the sum of the probabilities that the particle is spinning either upward 328
or downward. Suppose that there are two particles which can be spinning either 329
upward or downward. Both particles can be spinning upward; spinning downward; 330
particle-1 can be spinning upward while particle-2 spins downward; and vice versa. 331
The state vector, V which records the foregoing possibilities – i.e., the superposition 332
of the states – will be equal to the product of the spin-state of particle-1 and the 333
spin-state of particle-2. If the particles are both spinning upward or both spinning 334
downward, then V will be .5. However – relative to the value of each particle 335
vector, referred to as its eigenvalue – the probability that particle-1 will be spinning 336
upward is .5 and the probability that particle-2 will be spinning downward is .5, 337
such that the probability that both will be spinning upward or downward = .5× .5 338
= .25. Considered as the superposition of the two states, V will thus be unequal to 339
the product of their eigenvalues, and is said to be entangled. If the indeterminacy 340
evinced by entangled states is interpreted as inconsistency, then the computational 341
properties at issue might further have to be defined on a distribution of epistemic 342
possibilities which permit of hyperintensional distinctions.13 343
4.4 Modal Coalgebraic Automata and the Philosophy of 344
Mathematics 345
This section examines the philosophical significance of the Boolean-valued models 346
of set-theoretic languages and the modal coalgebraic automata to which they are 347
dually isomorphic. I argue that, similarly to second-order logical consequence, 348
(i) the ‘mathematical entanglement’ of !-logical validity does not undermine its 349
status as a relation of pure logic; and (ii) both the modal profile and model- 350
theoretic characterization of !-logical consequence provide a guide to its epistemic 351
12For an examination of the interaction between topos theory and an S4 modal axiomatization of
computable functions, see Awodey et al. (2000).
13The nature of the indeterminacy in question is examined in Saunders and Wallace (2008),
Deutsch (2010), Hawthorne (2010), Wilson (2011), Wallace (2012: 287–289), Lewis (2016: 277–
278), and Khudairi (ms). For a thorough examination of approaches to the ontology of quantum
mechanics, see Arntzenius (2012: ch. 3).
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tractability.14 I argue, then, that there are several considerations adducing in favor of 352
the claim that the interpretation of the concept of set constitutively involves modal 353
notions. The role of the category of modal coalegebraic deterministic automata 354
in (i) characterizing the modal profile of !-logical consequence, and (ii) being 355
constitutive of the formal understanding-conditions for the concept of set, provides, 356
then, support for a realist conception of the cumulative hierarchy. 357
4.4.1 Neo-Logicism 358
Frege’s (1884/1980; 1893/2013) proposal – that cardinal numbers can be explained 359
by specifying an equivalence relation, expressible in the signature of second-order 360
logic and identity, on lower-order representatives for higher-order entities – is the 361
first attempt to provide a foundation for mathematics on the basis of logical axioms 362
rather than rational or empirical intuition. In Frege (1884/1980. cit.: 68) and Wright 363
(1983: 104–105), the number of the concept, A, is argued to be identical to the 364
number of the concept, B, if and only if there is a one-to-one correspondence 365
between A and B, i.e., there is a bijective mapping, R, from A to B. With Nx: a 366
numerical term-forming operator, 367
• ∀A∀B∃R[[Nx: A = Nx: B ≡ ∃R[∀x[Ax→ ∃y(By ∧ Rxy ∧∀z(Bz ∧ Rxz→ y 368
= z))] ∧∀y[By→ ∃x(Ax ∧ Rxy ∧∀z(Az ∧ Rzy→ x = z))]]]. 369
Frege’s Theorem states that the Dedekind-Peano axioms for the language of 370
arithmetic can be derived from the foregoing abstraction principle, as augmented 371
to the signature of second-order logic and identity.15 Thus, if second-order logic 372
may be counted as pure logic, despite that domains of second-order models are 373
definable via power set operations, then one aspect of the philosophical significance 374
of the abstractionist program consists in its provision of a foundation for classical 375
mathematics on the basis of pure logic as augmented with non-logical implicit 376
definitions expressed by abstraction principles. 377
There are at least three reasons for which a logic defined in ZFC might not 378
undermine the status of its consequence relation as being logical. The first reason for 379
which the mathematical entanglement of !-logical validity might be innocuous is 380
that, as Shapiro (1991: 5.1.4) notes, many mathematical properties cannot be defined 381
within first-order logic, and instead require the expressive resources of second-order 382
logic. For example, the notion of well-foundedness cannot be expressed in a first- 383
order framework, as evinced by considerations of compactness. Let E be a binary 384
relation. Let m be a well-founded model, if there is no infinite sequence, a0, . . . , 385
14The phrase, ‘mathematical entanglement’, is owing to Koellner (2010: 2).
15Cf. Dedekend (1888/1963) and Peano (1889/1967). See Wright (1983: 154–169) for a proof
sketch of Frege’s theorem; Boolos (1987) for the formal proof thereof; and Parsons (1964) for an
incipient conjecture of the theorem’s validity.
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ai , such that Ea0, . . . , Eai+1 are all true. If m is well-founded, then there are no 386
infinite-descending E-chains. Suppose that T is a first-order theory containing m, 387
and that, for all natural numbers, n, there is a T with n + 1 elements, a0, . . . , an, 388
such that ⟨a0, a1⟩, . . . , ⟨an, an−1⟩ are in the extension of E. By compactness, there 389
is an infinite sequence such that a0 . . . ai , s.t. Ea0, . . . , Eai+1 are all true. So, m is 390
not well-founded. 391
By contrast, however, well-foundedness can be expressed in a second-order 392
framework: 393
∀X[∃xXx → ∃x[Xx ∧ ∀y(Xy → ¬Eyx)]], such that m is well-founded iff 394
every non-empty subset X has an element x, s.t. nothing in X bears E to x. 395
One aspect of the philosophical significance of well-foundedness is that it 396
provides a distinctively second-order constraint on when the membership relation in 397
a given model is intended. This contrasts with Putnam’s (1980) claim, that first-order 398
modelsmod can be intended, if every set s of reals inmod is such that an ω-model in 399
mod contains s and is constructible, such that – given the Downward Lowenheim- 400
Skolem theorem16 – if mod is non-constructible but has a submodel satisfying ‘s 401
is constructible’, then the model is non-well-founded and yet must be intended. 402
The claim depends on the assumption that general understanding-conditions and 403
conditions on intendedness must be co-extensive, to which I will return in Sect. 4.4.2 404
A second reason for which !-logic’s mathematical entanglement might not 405
be pernicious, such that the consequence relation specified in the !-logic might 406
be genuinely logical, may again be appreciated by its comparison with second- 407
order logic. Shapiro (1998) defines the model-theoretic characterization of logical 408
consequence as follows: 409
‘(10) * is a logical consequence of [a model] + if * holds in all possibilities 410
under every interpretation of the nonlogical terminology which holds in +’ (148). 411
A condition on the foregoing is referred to as the ‘isomorphism property’, 412
according to which ‘if two models M, M’ are isomorphic vis-a-vis the nonlogical 413
items in a formula *, then M satisfies * if and only if M’ satisfies *’ (151). 414
Shapiro argues, then, that the consequence relation specified using second-order 415
resources is logical, because of its modal and epistemic profiles. The epistemic 416
tractability of second-order validity consists in ‘typical soundness theorems, where 417
one shows that a given deductive system is ‘truth-preserving’ (154). He writes that: 418
‘[I]f we know that a model is a good mathematical model of logical consequence 419
(10), then we know that we won’t go wrong using a sound deductive system. Also, 420
we can know that an argument is a logical consequence . . . via a set-theoretic proof 421
in the metatheory’ (154–155). 422
The modal profile of second-order validity provides a second means of account- 423
ing for the property’s epistemic tractability. Shapiro argues, e.g., that: ‘If the 424
isomorphism property holds, then in evaluating sentences and arguments, the only 425
‘possibility’ we need to ‘vary’ is the size of the universe. If enough sizes are 426
16For any first-order model M , M has a submodel M ′ whose domain is at most denumerably
infinite, s.t. for all assignments s on, and formulas φ(x) in,M ′,M ,s ! φ(x) ⇐⇒ M ′,s ! φ(x).
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represented in the universe of models, then the modal nature of logical consequence 427
will be registered . . . [T]he only ‘modality’ we keep is ‘possible size’, which is 428
relegated to the set-theoretic metatheory’ (152). 429
Shapiro’s remarks about the considerations adducing in favor of the logicality 430
of non-effective, second-order validity generalize to !-logical validity. In the 431
previous section, the modal profile of !-logical validity was codified by the dual 432
isomorphism between complete Boolean-valued algebraic models of !-logic and 433
the category, A, of coalgebraic modal logics. As with Shapiro’s definition of logical 434
consequence, where * holds in all possibilities in the universe of models and 435
the possibilities concern the ‘possible size’ in the set-theoretic metatheory, the !- 436
Conjecture states that V |=! φ iff VB |=! φ, such that!-logical validity is invariant 437
in all set-forcing extensions of ground models in the set-theoretic multiverse. 438
Finally, the epistemic tractability of !-logical validity is secured, both – as on 439
Shapiro’s account of second-order logical consequence – by its soundness, but also 440
by its isomorphism to the coalgebraic category of deterministic automata, where the 441
determinacy thereof is again secured by the existence of Woodin cardinals. 442
4.4.2 Set-Theoretic Realism 443
In this section, I argue, finally, that the modal profile of !-logic can be availed of 444
in order to account for the understanding-conditions of the concept of set, and thus 445
crucially serve as part of the argument for set-theoretic realism. 446
Putnam (op. cit.: 473–474) argues that defining models of first-order theories is 447
sufficient for both understanding and specifying an intended interpretation of the 448
latter. Wright (1985: 124–125) argues, by contrast, that understanding-conditions 449
for mathematical concepts cannot be exhausted by the axioms for the theories 450
thereof, even on the intended interpretations of the theories. He suggests, e.g., that: 451
‘[I]f there really were uncountable sets, their existence would surely have to flow 452
from the concept of set, as intuitively satisfactorily explained. Here, there is, as it 453
seems to me, no assumption that the content of the ZF-axioms cannot exceed what is 454
invariant under all their classical models. [Benacerraf] writes, e.g., that: ‘It is granted 455
that they are to have their ‘intended interpretation’: ‘e’ is to mean set-membership. 456
Even so, and conceived as encoding the intuitive concept of set, they fail to entail 457
the existence of uncountable sets. So how can it be true that there are such sets? 458
Benacerraf’s reply is that the ZF-axioms are indeed faithful to the relevant informal 459
notions only if, in addition to ensuring that ‘E’ means set-membership, we interpret 460
them so as to observe the constraint that ‘the universal quantifier has to mean all or at 461
least all sets’ (p. 103). It follows, of course, that if the concept of set does determine 462
a background against which Cantor’s theorem, under its intended interpretation, is 463
sound, there is more to the concept of set that can be explained by communication of 464
the intended sense of ‘e’ and the stipulation that the ZF-axioms are to hold. And the 465
residue is contained, presumably, in the informal explanations to which, Benacerraf 466
reminds us, Zermelo intended his formalization to answer. At least, this must be so if 467
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the ‘intuitive concept of set’ is capable of being explained at all. Yet it is notable that 468
Benacerraf nowhere ventures to supply the missing informal explanation – the story 469
which will pack enough into the extension of ‘all sets’ to yield Cantor’s theorem, 470
under its intended interpretation, as a highly non-trivial corollary’(op. cit). 471
In order to provide the foregoing explanation in virtue of which the concept of set 472
can be shown to be associated with a realistic notion of the cumulative hierarchy, I 473
will argue that there are several points in the model theory and epistemology of set- 474
theoretic languages at which the interpretation of the concept of set constitutively 475
involves modal notions. The aim of the section will thus be to provide a modal 476
foundation for mathematical platonism. 477
One point is in the coding of the signature of the theory, T, in which Gödel’s 478
incompleteness theorems are proved (cf. Halbach and Visser 2014). Relative to, 479
(i) a choice of coding for an ω-complete, recursively axiomatizable language, L, 480
of T – i.e. a mapping between properties of numbers and properties of terms 481
and formulas in L; 482
(ii) a predicate, phi; and 483
(iii) a fixed-point construction: 484
Let phi express the property of ‘being provable’, and define (iii) such that, 485
for all consistent theories T of L, there are sentences, pphi , corresponding to 486
each formula, phi(x), in T, s.t. for ‘m’ := pphi , 487
|–T pphi iff phi(m). 488
One can then construct a sentence, ‘m’ := ¬phi(m), such that L is incom- 489
plete (the first incompleteness theorem). 490
Moreover, L cannot prove its own consistency: 491
If: 492
|–T ‘m’ iff ¬phi(m), 493
Then: 494
|–T C→ m. 495
Thus, L is consistent only if L is inconsistent (the second incompleteness 496
theorem). 497
In the foregoing, the choice of coding bridges the numerals in the language 498
with the properties of the target numbers. The choice of coding is therefore 499
intensional, and has been marshalled in order to argue that the very notion of 500
syntactic computability – via the equivalence class of partial recursive functions, 501
λ-definable terms, and the transition functions of discrete-state automata such as 502
Turing machines – is constitutively semantic (cf. Rescorla 2015). Further points 503
at which intensionality can be witnessed in the phenomenon of self-reference in 504
arithmetic are introduced by Reinhardt (1986). Reinhardt (op. cit.: 470–472) argues 505
that the provability predicate can be defined relative to the minds of particular agents 506
– similarly to Quine’s (1968) and Lewis’ (1979) suggestion that possible worlds can 507
be centered by defining them relative to parameters ranging over tuples of spacetime 508
coordinates or agents and locations – and that a theoretical identity statement can be 509
established for the concept of the foregoing minds and the concept of a computable 510
system. 511
UN
CO
RR
EC
TE
D
PR
OO
F
4 Modal !-Logic: Automata, Neo-Logicism, and Set-Theoretic Realism
In the previous section, intensional computational properties were defined via 512
modal coalgebraic deterministic automata, where the coalgebraic categories are 513
dually isomorphic to the category of sets in which !-logical validity was defined. 514
Coalgebraic modal logic was shown to elucidate the modal profile of!-logical con- 515
sequence in the Boolean-valued algebraic models of set theory. The intensionality 516
witnessed by the choice of coding may therefore be further witnessed by the modal 517
automata specified in the foregoing coalgebraic logic. 518
A second point at which understanding-conditions may be shown to be con- 519
stitutively modal can be witnessed by the conditions on the epistemic entitlement 520
to assume that the language in which Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem is 521
proved is consistent (cf. Dummett 1963/1978; Wright 1985). Wright (op. cit.: 91, 522
fn.9) suggests that ‘[T]o treat [a] proof as establishing consistency is implicitly 523
to exclude any doubt . . . about the consistency of first-order number theory’. 524
Wright’s elaboration of the notion of epistemic entitlement, appeals to a notion 525
of rational ‘trust’, which he argues is recorded by the calculation of ‘expected 526
epistemic utility’ in the setting of decision theory (2004; 2014: 226, 241). Wright 527
notes that the rational trust subserving epistemic entitlement will be pragmatic, 528
and makes the intriguing point that ‘pragmatic reasons are not a special genre of 529
reason, to be contrasted with e.g. epistemic, prudential, and moral reasons’ (2012: 530
484). Crucially, however, the very idea of expected epistemic utility in the setting 531
of decision theory makes implicit appeal to the notion of possible worlds, where the 532
latter can again be determined by the coalgebraic logic for modal automata. 533
A third consideration adducing in favor of the thought that grasp of the concept 534
of set might constitutively possess a modal profile is that the concept can be defined 535
as an intension – i.e., a function from possible worlds to extensions. The modal 536
similarity types in the coalgebraic modal logic may then be interpreted as dynamic- 537
interpretational modalities, where the dynamic-interpretational modal operator has 538
been argued to entrain the possible reinterpretations both of the domains of the 539
theory’s quantifiers (cf. Fine 2005, 2006), as well as of the intensions of non-logical 540
concepts, such as the membership relation (cf. Uzquiano 2015).17 541
The fourth consideration avails directly of the modal profile of !-logical 542
consequence. While the above dynamic-interpretational modality will suffice for 543
17For an examination of the philosophical significance of modal coalgebraic automata beyond the
philosophy of mathematics, see Baltag (2003). Baltag (op. cit.) proffers a colagebraic semantics
for dynamic-epistemic logic, where coalgebraic functors are intended to record the informational
dynamics of single- and multi-agent systems. For an algebraic characterization of dynamic-
epistemic logic, see Kurz and Palmigiano (2013). For further discussion, see Khudairi (ms). The
latter proceeds by examining undecidable sentences via the epistemic interpretation of multi-
dimensional intensional semantics. See Reinhardt (1974), for a similar epistemic interpretation
of set-theoretic languages, in order to examine the reduction of the incompleteness of undecidable
sentences on the counterfactual supposition that the language is augmented by stronger axioms
of infinity; and Maddy (1988b), for critical discussion. Chihara (2004) argues, as well, that
conceptual possibilities can be treated as imaginary situations with regard to the construction of
open-sentence tokens, where the latter can then be availed of in order to define nominalistically
adequate arithmetic properties.
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possible reinterpretations of mathematical terms, the absoluteness and generic 544
invariance of the consequence relation is such that, if the !-conjecture is true, then 545
!-logical validity is invariant in all possible set-forcing extensions of ground models 546
in the set-theoretic multiverse. The truth of the !-conjecture would thereby place 547
an indefeasible necessary condition on a formal understanding of the intension for 548
the concept of set. 549
4.5 Concluding Remarks 550
In this essay I have examined the philosophical significance of the isomorphism 551
between Boolean-valued algebraic models of modal!-logic and modal coalgebraic 552
models of automata. I argued that – as with the property of validity in second- 553
order logic – !-logical validity is genuinely logical, and thus entails a type 554
of neo-logicism in the foundations of mathematics. I argued, then, that modal 555
coalegebraic deterministic automata, which characterize the modal profile of !- 556
logical consequence, are constitutive of the interpretation of mathematical concepts 557
such as the membership relation. The philosophical significance of modal !-logic 558
is thus that it can be availed of to vindicate both a neo-logicist foundation for set 559
theory and a realist interpretation of the cumulative hierarchy of sets. 560
References 561
Arntzenius, F. 2012. Space, Time, and Stuff. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 562
Awodey, S., L. Birkedal, and D. Scott. 2000. Local Realizability Toposes and a Modal Logic for 563
Computability. Technical Report No. CMU-PHIL-99. 564
Bagaria, J., N. Castells, and P. Larson. 2006. An !-logic Primer. Trends in Mathematics: Set 565
Theory. Basel: Birkhäuser Verlag. 566
Baltag, A. 2003. A coalgebraic semantics for epistemic programs. Electronic Notes in Theoretical 567
Computer Science 82: 1. 568
Boolos, G. 1987. The Consistency of Frege’s Foundations of Arithmetic. In On Being and Saying,AQ3 569
ed. J.J. Thomson. MIT Press. 570
Chihara, C. 2004. A Structural Account of Mathematics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 571
Dedekend, R. 1888/1963. Was sind und was sollen die Zahlen? In Essays on the Theory of 572
Numbers. Trans. and ed. W. Beman. New York: Dover. 573
Deutsch, D. 2010. Apart from Universes. InMany Worlds? Everett, Quantum Theory, and Reality, 574
ed. S. Saunders, J. Barrett, A. Kent, and D. Wallace. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 575
Deutsch, D. 2013. Constructor theory. Synthese 190: 4331–4359. 576
Dummett, M. 1963/1978. The Philosophical Significance of Gödel’s Theorem. In Truth and Other 577
Enigmas, ed. M. Dummett. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 578
Fine, K. 2005. Our Knowledge of Mathematical Objects. InOxford Studies in Epistemology, vol. 1, 579
ed. T. Gendler and J. Hawthorne. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 580
Fine, K. 2006. Relatively Unrestricted Quantification. In Absolute Generality, ed. A. Rayo and G. 581
Uzquiano. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 582
Frege, G. 1884/1980. The Foundations of Arithmetic, 2nd ed. Trans. J.L. Austin. Northwestern 583
University Press. 584
UN
CO
RR
EC
TE
D
PR
OO
F
4 Modal !-Logic: Automata, Neo-Logicism, and Set-Theoretic Realism
Frege, G. 1893/2013. Basic Laws of Arithmetic, vol. I–II. Trans. and ed. P. Ebert, M. Rossberg, C. 585
Wright, and R. Cook. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 586
Gödel, K. 1931/1986. On Formally Undecidable Propositions of Principia Mathematica and 587
Related Systems I. In Collected Works, vol. I, ed. S. Feferman, J. Dawson, S. Kleene, G. Moore, 588
R. Solovay, and J. van Heijenoort. Oxford University Press. 589
Gödel, K. 1946/1990. Remarks before the Princeton Bicentennial Conference on Problems in 590
Mathematics. In Collected Works, vol. II, ed. S. Feferman, J. Dawson, S. Kleene, G. Moore, R. 591
Solovay, and J. van Heijenoort. Oxford University Press. 592
Halbach, V., and A. Visser. 2014. Self-reference in arithmetic I. Review of Symbolic Logic 7: 4. 593
Hawthorne, J. 2010. AMetaphysician Looks at the Everett Interpretation. InManyWorlds? Everett, 594
Quantum Theory, and Reality, ed. S. Saunders, J. Barrett, A. Kent, and D. Wallace. Oxford: 595
Oxford University Press. 596
Henkin, L., J.D. Monk, and A. Tarski. 1971. Cylindric Algebras, Part I. Amsterdam: North-AQ4 597
Holland. 598
Jech, T. 2003. Set Theory, 3rd Millennium ed. Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer. 599
Kanamori, A. 2007. Gödel and set theory. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 13: 2. 600
Kanamori, A. 2008. Cohen and set theory. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 14: 3. 601
Kanamori, A. 2012a. Large Cardinals with Forcing. In Handbook of the History of Logic: Sets and 602
Extensions in the Twentieth Century, ed. D. Gabbay, A. Kanamori, and J. Woods. Amsterdam: 603
Elsevier. 604
Kanamori, A. 2012b. Set theory from Cantor to Cohen. In Handbook of the History of Logic: 605
Sets and Extensions in the Twentieth Century, ed. D. Gabbay, A. Kanamori, and J. Woods. 606
Amsterdam: Elsevier. 607
Koellner, P. 2010. On strong logics of first and second order. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 16: 1. 608
Koellner, P. 2013. Large Cardinals and Determinacy. In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.AQ5 609
Koellner, P., and W.H. Woodin. 2010. Large Cardinals from Determinacy. In Handbook of Set 610
Theory, vol. 3, ed. M. Foreman and A. Kanamori. Dordrecht/Heidelberg: Springer. 611
Kurz, A., and A. Palmigiano. 2013. Epistemic updates on algebras. Logical Methods in Computer 612
Science 9(4): 17. 613
Lando, T. 2015. First order S4 and its measure-theoretic semantics. Annals of Pure and Applied 614
Logic 166: 187–218. 615
Lewis, D. 1979. Attitudes De Dicto and De Se. Philosophical Review 88: 4. 616
Lewis, P. 2016. Quantum Ontology. New York: Oxford University Press. 617
Maddy, P. 1988a. Believing the axioms I. Journal of Symbolic Logic 53: 2. 618
Maddy, P. 1988b. Believing the axioms II. Journal of Symbolic Logic 53: 3. 619
Marcus, G. 2001. The Algebraic Mind: Integrating Connectionism and Cognitive Science. 620
Cambridge: MIT Press. 621
McKinsey, J., and A. Tarski. 1944. The algebra of topology. The Annals of Mathematics, Second 622
Series 45: 1. 623
Peano, G. 1889/1967. The Principles of Arithmetic, Presented by a New Method (Trans. J. van 624
Heijenoort). In J. van Heijenoort (1967). 625
Putnam, H. 1980. Models and reality. Journal of Symbolic Logic 45: 3. 626
Quine, W.V. 1968. Propositional objects. Crítica 2: 5. 627
Rasiowa, H. 1963. On modal theories. Acta Philosophica Fennica 16: 123–136. 628
Reinhardt, W. 1974. Remarks on Reflection Principles, Large Cardinals, and Elementary Embed- 629
dings. In Proceedings of Symposia in Pure Mathematics, Vol. 13, Part 2: Axiomatic Set Theory, 630
ed. T. Jech. American Mathematical Society. 631
Reinhardt, W. 1986. Epistemic theories and the interpretation of Gödel’s incompleteness theorems. 632
Journal of Philosophical Logic 15: 4. 633
Rescorla, M. 2015. The representational foundations of computation. Philosophia Mathematica. 634
https://doi.org/10.1093/philmat/nkv009 635
Rittberg, C. 2015. How woodin changed his mind: new thoughts on the continuum hypothesis. 636
Archive for History of Exact Sciences 69: 2. 637
UN
CO
RR
EC
TE
D
PR
OO
F
H. Khudairi
Saunders, S., and D. Wallace. 2008. Branching and uncertainty. British Journal for the Philosophy 638
of Science 59: 293–305. 639
Shapiro, S. 1991. Foundations Without Foundationalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 640
Shapiro, S. 1998. Logical Consequence: Models and Modality. In The Philosophy of Mathematics 641
Today, ed. M. Schirn. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 642
Takeuchi, M. 1985. Topological coalgebras. Journal of Algebra 97: 505–539. 643
Uzquiano, G. 2015. Varieties of indefinite extensibility. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 58: 644
1. 645
Venema, Y. 2007. Algebras and coalgebras. In Handbook of Modal Logic, ed. P. Blackburn, J. van 646
Benthem, and F. Wolter. Amsterdam: Elsevier. 647
Venema, Y. 2013. Cylindric Modal Logic. In Cylindric-Like Algebras and Algebraic Logic, 648
ed. H. Andráka, M. Ferenczi, and I. Németi. Berlin/Heidelberg: János Bolyai Mathematical 649
Society/Springer. 650
Wallace, D. 2012. The Emergent Multiverse. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 651
Wilson, A. 2011. Macroscopic ontology in everettian quantummechanics.Philosophical Quarterly 652
61: 243. 653
Woodin, W.H. 1999. The Axiom of Determinacy, Forcing Axioms, and the Nonstationary Ideal. 654
Berlin/New York, de Gruyter. 655
Woodin, W.H. 2010. Strong Axioms of Infinity and the Search for V. In Proceedings of theAQ6 656
International Congress of Mathematicians. 657
Woodin, W.H. 2011. The Realm of the Infinite. In Infinity: New Research Frontiers, ed. M. Heller 658
and W.H. Woodin. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 659
Woodin, W.H. ms. The ! Conjecture. 660
Wright, C. 1983. Frege’s Conception of Numbers as Objects. Aberdeen: Aberdeen University 661
Press. 662
Wright, C. 1985. Skolem and the sceptic. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary 663
Volume 59: 85–138. 664
Wright, C. 2004. Warrant for nothing (and foundations for free)? Proceedings of the Aristotelian 665
Society, Supplementary Volume 78: 1. 666
Wright, C. 2012. Replies, Part IV: Warrant Transmission and Entitlement. In Mind, Meaning and 667
Knowledge, ed. A. Coliva. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 668
Wright, C. 2014. On Epistemic Entitlement II. In Scepticism and Perceptual Justification, ed. D. 669
Dodd and E. Zardini. New York: Oxford University Press. 670
UN
CO
RR
EC
TE
D
PR
OO
F
AUTHOR QUERIES
AQ1. We have retain the “Footnote 1” in the section. Please check if okay.
AQ2. Please provide details of “Woodin (2001), Gödel (1940), Cohen (1963,
1964), Hughes (2001) and Parsons (1964)” in reference list.
AQ3. Please provide publisher location for “Boolos (1987), Reinhardt (1974),
Frege (1884/1980), Gödel (1931/1986), and Gödel (1946/1990)”.
AQ4. Please cite “Henkin et al. (1971), Wright (2004), Wright (2012), and Wright
(2014)” in text.
AQ5. Please provide publisher details for “Koellner (2013) and Peano
(1889/1967)”.
AQ6. Please provide conference location for “Woodin (2010)”.
